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The Baltic Crusades started during the Second Crusade (1147-1149), but continued into 
the fifteenth century. Unlike the crusades in the Holy Lands, the Baltic Crusades were 
implemented in order to combat the pagan tribes in the Baltic. These crusades were generally 
conducted by German and Danish nobles (with occasional assistance from Sweden) instead of 
contingents from England and France. Although the Baltic Crusades occurred in many different 
countries and over several centuries, they occurred as a result of common root causes. For the 
purpose of this study, I will be focusing on the northern crusades between 1147 and 1309. In 
1309 the Teutonic Order, the monastic order that led these crusades, moved their headquarters 
from Venice, where the Order focused on reclaiming the Holy Lands, to Marienberg, which was 
on the frontier of the Baltic Crusades. This signified a change in the importance of the Baltic 
Crusades and the motivations of the crusaders. The Baltic Crusades became the main theater of 
the Teutonic Order and local crusaders, and many of the causes for going on a crusade changed 
at this time due to this new focus. Prior to the year 1310 the Baltic Crusades occurred for several 
reasons. A changing knightly ethos combined with heightened religious zeal and the evolution of 
institutional and ideological changes in just warfare and forced conversions were crucial in the 
development of the Baltic Crusades. However, the initial cause stemmed from economic 
concerns rather than religious motivations of the northern nobles. The Baltic Crusades continued 
and were spearheaded by the Teutonic Order spearheaded in response to the tumultuous politics 
and ongoing power struggle within the Holy Roman Empire.  
Fifty years after the First Crusade landed in the Holy Lands, the Baltic Crusades started 
in 1147 with the Wendish Crusade which was conducted by the Danes. The Germans and 
Scandinavians defined the Wends as the westernmost Slavic tribes.
1
 They inhabited the land 
                                                             
1 Eric Christiansen, The Northern Crusades, London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1997, 27. 
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along the South of the Baltic Sea from the bay of Kiel to the Vistula.
2
 The Wends consisted of 
several nations: the Wagrians, Abotrites, Polabians, Liutizians, Rugians and Pomeranians.
3
 Many 
of the nations spoke different but similar languages, and operated independent of each other with 
the exception of the loosely united Abotrites and Polabians. From 1200-1292, the Danes 
campaigned against Finland, and two German monastic orders, the Swordbrothers and the 
Teutonic Order, rose to prominence and conducted crusades against the pagan Balts in the 
Livonian, Prussian, and Estonian Crusades. A priest founded the Swordbrothers in 1202 in the 
city of Riga with the express purpose of fighting the pagans in the Baltic.
4
 The Teutonic Order 
was founded in Acre in 1190 to care for German crusaders, but they eventually took up a militant 
role in northern Europe.
5
 The Balts, like the Wends, consisted of several nations divided into 
smaller tribes, which were the functioning political units.
6
 The Prussian tribes lived between the 
Lower Vistula, the Narew, the Niemen, and the Baltic coast.
7
 The Lithuanians were a 
combination of two tribes: the Zemaiciai (referred to as the Samogitians) and the Aukstaiciai, 
and they inhabited the land north and east of the Niemen.
8
 North of the lower Dvina lived the 
Lettigallians, and the Semigallians and Selonians inhabited the land south of the river.
9
 The 
Curonians lived on the peninsula between the Baltic and the Gulf of Riga and had a language 
similar to the Letts even though they interacted with the northern tribes more than the 
                                                             
2 Refer to Appendix 1 for a map of the pagan tribes. Map provided by http://www.inspiritoo.com/the-republic-
novgorod.html. A timeline of important events has also been provided. The timeline is based on Christiansen, The 
Northern Crusades, ix-xii with a few key additions and subtractions of my own. 
3 Christiansen, The Northern Crusades, 27 
4 Henricus Lettus, The Chronicle of Henry of Livonia, trans. James A. Brundage. New York, Columbia University 
Press, 2003, 40. 
5 William Urban, The Teutonic Knights: A Military History. South Yorkshire: Pen &Sword Books Ltd.,2011.9 
6 Christiansen, The Northern Crusades, 37 
7
 Ibid. 36-37 
8 Ibid. 37 
9 Ibid. 36 
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neighboring Letts did, and they adopted significant parts of the northern cultures.
10
 North of the 
Curonians, the Estonians inhabited the highlands and southern coast of the Finnish Gulf while 
the Livs occupied the land around the mouth of the Dvina.
11
 Another tribe, the Vods, lived at the 
head of the Gulf of Finland between Novgorod and the river Narva.
12
 North of the Gulf lived the 
northernmost tribes consisting of four Fennic groups that were collectively called the Finns by 
Western sources.
13
 The most notable of the Fennic tribes was the Karelians, and they lived 
directly north of the Vods.  
Before the Wendish Crusade began several key ideological and institutional changes took 
place in the previous century that allowed the crusades against the pagans to occur. One of these 
changes was the cultural shift whereby nobles were drawn to fighting the enemies of Christ. For 
example, religious reforms such as the Truce and Peace of God enabled the crusades against the 
Muslims to occur, and subsequently the pagans in the Baltic.
14
 The Truce of God was an attempt 
to curb the violence between Christian nations, and established a precedent of the Church getting 
involved in warfare.  From a Truce of God proclamation in Cologne Germany (1083),  
            If anyone attempts to oppose this pious institution and is unwilling to promise peace to 
God…or to observe it, no priest in our diocese shall presume to say a mass for him or 
shall take an care for his salvation; if he is sick, no Christian shall dare to visit him; on his 
deathbed he shall not receive the Eucharist, unless he repents.
15
 
Furthermore, the Church stated anyone who violated the peace would be excommunicated. A 
knight’s eternal soul was jeopardized if he violated the peace the Church proposed. The Church 
gained some influence on how warfare was conducted through the Peace and Truce of God 
                                                             
10 Ibid. 37 
11 Christiansen, The Northern Crusades, 40 
12 Ibid, 41 
13 Ibid 
14
 James M. Powell, Anatomy of a Crusade, Philadelphia, 1986, 20. 
15 “Declaration of the Truce of God,” in The Crusades, ed. S. J. Allen and Emilie Amt, University of Toronto Press 
Incorporated, 2010, 30-31. 
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movement and how it connected to the new knightly ethos. Knights were quickly embracing the 
poetic notion of fighting evil, and at the same time the Church was issuing reforms to try and 
reduce the infighting.  The concern for one’s soul made it more important for a noble to obey the 
Church, so when the Church decided the Muslims or pagans should be fought for the sake of 
Christianity the nobility were much more likely to join the Crusade. In one instance Holy Roman 
Emperor Frederick II (1220-1250), promised to go on a crusade, but he kept delaying his 
departure, and eventually the papacy grew impatient and excommunicated him. These reforms 
demonstrate key changes that were vital in the Baltic Crusades. 
A changing knightly ethos further contributed to the crusading movement. The Song of 
Roland was about the conquests of Charlemagne in the eighth century, but it reveals how the 
nobles of the eleventh century were embracing these poetic deeds (the tale was written down in 
the eleventh century). First, it depicted how an ideal knight should act. “Count Roland (the hero 
in the tale) never loved the cowardly, or the proud, or the wicked, or any knight who was not a 
good vassal.”16 Crusaders, especially knights in the military orders, were supposed to be humble, 
and this quotation shows a rejection of pride.
17
 Furthermore, there is a denunciation of cowardice 
and wickedness in general, and those aspects carried over into the Crusades. Roland is portrayed 
as a nearly invincible knight, and the only reasons he is not able to completely defeat the 
Muslims as they flee to Spain is his horse was killed, and he is left on foot. This tale conveyed a 
highly romanticized image of what a knight could and should be. A knight engaged foes who 
were intrinsically evil. Furthermore, knights were valiant defenders of Christendom. Moreover, 
                                                             
16 “The Song of Roland,” in The Crusades, ed. S. J. Allen and Emilie Amt, (University of Toronto Press Incorporated, 
2010), 25-28. 
17
 This is apparent in the rules each military order instituted. Knights in the orders were instructed to be obedient 
and humble among many other things. This aspect will be explored further when the Teutonic Order develops in 
the Holy Lands. 
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when Count Roland died at the end of the tale he was escorted to paradise, so fighting against the 
Muslims was seen as an honor with a distinct religious reward. This new mindset held by the 
nobility in Europe helped foster the crusading movement that emerged in 1095. 
Contemporary sources are skewed in the favor of the Christian kingdoms because the 
clergy provides most of the contemporary sources, so the pagan tribes are seldom represented. 
However, many sources are still useful when studying the Baltic Crusades. First, letters and 
treatises written by the clergy such as In Praise of the New Knighthood by Bernard of Clairvaux 
provide insight into the changing mores and concerns of the Christian kingdoms.
18
 Second, papal 
and imperial bulls provide another lens. Papal bulls reveal why crusades were called and what 
the moral justifications for crusading were, and imperial bulls allow the religious and political 
values of imperial Germany to be evaluated. Finally, the most important source for studying the 
Baltic Crusades is chronicles. The Chronicle of the Slavs was written by the priest Helmold of 
Bosau between 1167 and 1172 and served as a history of the Christianization of the Slavs. 
Helmold’s chronicles shows early interactions between the pagans and Christians, and it shows 
the perceived problems of the first crusades in the Baltic. A Catholic priest, Henry, wrote The 
Chronicle of Henry of Livonia, an indispensible document for this time period as it reveals much 
of the religious and political motivations from the years 1180-1226. The Livländische 
Reimchronik covers 1180-1290 and was written from the perspective of a crusading knight; 
however, the author remained anonymous. The chronicle romanticized the crusades and served 
                                                             
18 Bernard of Clairvaux was instrumental in the Baltic Crusades. Bernard was an abbot in the Cistercian Order, and 
he helped preach the crusades.   
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as a recruitment piece, so it reveals the cultural values of the time.
19
 Combined these sources 
provide a glimpse into the minds and actions of Christians during the Baltic Crusades.  
The Baltic Crusades saw many ideological, institutional, and political shifts, but the 
events are seldom discussed. This lack of discussion stems from several sources; one; it is a 
controversial topic in the national histories of the Christianized countries; two, the effects seem 
marginal to many Americans; and three, the source material can be hard to find in English. 
However, the Baltic Crusades have been widely explored by German and Baltic historians. This 
is a divisive issue in the region, and many people still feel resentment about these Crusades; as a 
result they have no qualms writing partisan accounts to further their agenda.
20
 This drowns out 
the reliable historians who are trying to assess the Crusades from a non-nationalistic viewpoint. 
The preconceived notions of the Crusade and nationalistic biases are addressed by the English 
speaking authority on the Baltic Crusades, William Urban, in his article “Victims of the Baltic 
Crusade.”21 Many assume the pagan tribes were all victims of foreign invaders and frequently 
compare the Baltic Crusades to the conquest of North America by Europeans. Some have 
advanced this argument of victimhood purely for political reasons, so what actually happened is 
distorted. The biggest problem with this pervasive mindset is when the pagan tribes are viewed 
purely as victims their agency is devalued, and that was not the case. The Baltic Crusades 
consisted of winners and losers, and many of the pagan tribes were winners such as the Letts and 
                                                             
19 This study will not focus on the Livländische Reimchronik because I could only find German copies of the text 
until the very end of my study. However, the chronicle is frequently used by historians of the Baltic Crusades, so it 
cannot be ignored either. Many of the sources used in this study utilize this document, so it is indirectly involved in 
the arguments presented. Although it was not essential for my study, The Chronicle of Novgorod provides the 
Greek Orthodox perspective of the conflict.  
20 William Urban, “Victims of the Baltic Crusade,” 
http://department.monm.edu/history/urban/articles/VictimsBalticCrusade.htm. Talks about this topic in much 
greater detail. 
21 Ibid. 
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Livs.
22
 The Letts and Livs were weak and subjugated to stronger pagan tribes, but they increased 
their power through military and financial support from the Crusaders. Many of the traditionally 
strong tribes waned in power as a result. The pagan tribes had traditional enemies, and the arrival 
of the Crusaders provided another tool to use against them in their ongoing power struggle, and 
the tribes that capitalized on this opportunity fared well.
23
 The cultural challenge for historians of 
the Baltic Crusades is not falling into the preconceived notions of victimhood. One must 
remember every group involved was fighting to win. As much as the Crusaders were spreading 
Christianity and their political organization, the pagan tribes were using these Crusaders to defeat 
their rivals. 
The complex nature of the Baltic Crusades is being evaluated by an increasing number of 
historians. The Baltic Crusades were on the Crusades in the Holy Lands, so many books discuss 
the Baltic Crusades as a side note to the Crusades to the Holy Lands such as Anatomy of a 
Crusade: 1213-1221 by James M. Powell. This book explores how the Crusades were organized, 
funded, and the Germans’ involvement in the Crusades in the Holy Lands. First, Powell argues 
family was important in the crusades, and family members usually went on crusades together, 
and bishops encouraged their own natal families to go on a crusade.
24
 Powell argues the Fifth 
Crusade failed because it did not bring all of the Christian forces to bear at the same time. 
Crusades were challenging to implement because money was frequently a problem, and nobles 
would try going on crusades closer to home rather than in the Holy Lands.
25
 Furthermore, 
conflicts sprang up frequently in Europe, and the Holy Roman Empire was one of the worst 
                                                             
22 Ibid.  
23
 Urban, “Victims of the Baltic Crusades.” 
24 Powell, Anatomy of a Crusade, 82. 
25 Ibid. 93-94. 
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hotbeds. This exacerbated the problem as Emperor Frederick II was expected to lead the Fifth 
Crusade. 
There have also been some influential general overviews written about the Baltic 
Crusades, and one of the most highly acclaimed modern works on the Baltic Crusades is The 
Northern Crusades by Eric Christiansen. Christiansen builds his argument from the premise that 
the subject is seldom studied in detail by English speakers, and as a result only the propaganda 
film Alexander Nevsky provides context for these campaigns
26
. Christiansen attempts to dispel 
any preconceived notions his readers may have from this film and to educate readers who have 
never heard of the Baltic Crusades. First, he explores what the natives of the region were like and 
how they were organized. Christiansen argues the native pagans were constantly interacting and 
competing with the Christian kingdoms (chiefly Denmark and Germany) for territory and trade.
27
 
Competition was the spark that started the Baltic Crusades, and the Baltic Crusades were 
primarily fought between long time rivals.
28
 Christiansen contends the crusaders had religious 
motivations, and he argues Christians felt they had to physically defeat the pagans before they 
could truly convert.
29
 He contends this need to physically defeat the pagans helped fuel the 
already tense relations between the pagans and the Christians. Very similar to this work is The 
Baltic Crusades by William Urban.
30
 Urban advances a similar argument to Christiansen, but 
The Baltic Crusades is the source most historians refer to when discussing the Baltic Crusades. 
                                                             
26 Alexander Nevsky directed by Sergei M. Eisenstein. Aired December 1, 1938. DVD. An award winning film made 
in 1938. It depicts the Russian prince, Alexander Nevsky, fighting off the invading Teutonic Knights. At the time 
tensions were increasing between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. Despite their Non-Aggression Pact, the 
Germans were seen as increasingly expansionistic. The Germans also used Teutonic Knight imagery in their 
propaganda to depict themselves as holy warriors.  
27 Christiansen, The Northern Crusades, 43, 45-46  
28
 Christiansen, The Northern Crusades, 49 
29 Christiansen, The Northern Crusades, 56 
30 William Urban, The Baltic Crusades. Chicago 1994. 
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Studies of the Teutonic Order are few in number, but The Teutonic Knights: A Military 
History by William Urban follows the Teutonic Order from its inception to its eventual demise in 
the fifteenth century. Urban contends the Teutonic Order started out of an act of desperation.
31
He 
further contends many of the Order’s actions were influenced by the failed excursion in 
Hungary, and future Grand Masters would seek guarantees before campaigning in Europe 
again.
32
 This aspect of the Teutonic Order was further explored by Nicholas Morton when he 
argued the Teutonic Order’s ability to appear neutral while actually favoring the Holy Roman 
Empire during the Ibelin-Lombard conflict reaped benefits for them.
33
 They were able to gain 
land from both parties and served as a mediator between the groups, so their reputation grew. 
Marian Dygo takes Morton’s argument a step further and argues Herman von Salza, Grand 
Master of the Teutonic Order, was actually given allodial land by the Emperor and was therefore 
a subject of the Empire rather than the leader of an autonomous organization.
34
 Dygo contends 
this is the reason Emperor Frederick II favored the Teutonic Order, and this favor is ultimately 
what led to them taking charge in the Baltic Crusades. The general consensus regarding the 
Teutonic Order is it was a dynamic organization that was influenced by the surrounding 
Christian kingdoms, and these interactions altered their policies and actions. 
The organization and structure of the Teutonic Order, and monastic orders in general, 
were further studied by James W. Brodman. The Teutonic Order’s military Rule was based on 
that of the Knights Templar, but they were primarily a hospitaller order similar to the Knights 
                                                             
31 Urban, The Teutonic Knights, 11. 
32 Ibid. 55-56. 
33 Morton, “The Teutonic Knights in the Ibelin-Lombard Conflict,” 139-140 
34 Marian Dygo, “The German Empire and the Grand Master of the Teutonic Order in the Light of the Golden Bull 
of Rimini,” Acta Poloniae Historica 61, (1990): 33-61. 
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Hospitaller.
35
 Brodman states the Order was founded to care for sick Germans in the Holy Lands, 
so they were not even initially a military order.
36
 Rather than viewing themselves as primarily a 
fighting group they were hospitallers with a combat arm, and they continued to fulfill their 
hospitaller goals even after they acquired more territory and adopted a militant role. “Rule and 
Identity: The Case of the Military Orders” by William Urban discusses how the Teutonic Order 
conducted internal matters and elected their leaders.
37
 The process of selecting leaders relied on a 
massive gathering and election process, and that led to rivalries.
38
 Furthermore, each Grand 
Master had a different vision, so the Order’s goals changed frequently, and their actions would 
change as a result.
39
 
One difficulty with studying the Baltic Crusades is much of the scholarship focuses on 
the Lithuanian Crusades because it is where the Teutonic Order met its demise. Scholars 
generally argue the Teutonic Order was the dominant force in the Baltic by 1309, and their main 
concern was self-justification and maintaining the flow of recruits. Paul Hardwick argues in “The 
Knightly Class of Europe and the Lithuanian Crusades” that the piety of the Teutonic Order 
reached new heights in the fourteenth century.
40
 He argues the Order had to justify itself to the 
rest of Christendom because although the crusades to the Holy Lands were readily accepted, the 
crusades to the Baltic were often questioned.
41
 Hardwick ends his argument by saying the 
                                                             
35 James W. Brodman, “Rule and Identity: The Case of the Military Orders,” The Catholic Historical Review 87, no. 3 
(July 2001), 388. 
36 Ibid. 388. 
37 Urban, The Teutonic Knights. Delves into this topic more than any of his other works. 
38 Klaus Militzer, “From the Holy Lands to Prussia: the Teutonic Knights between Emperors and Popes and their 
Policies until 1309,” in Mendicants, Military Orders, and Regionalism in Medieval Europe, ed. Jürgen Sarnowsky 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), 73. 
39 Ibid. 
 
40
 Paul Hardwick, “The Knightly Class of Europe and the Lithuanian Crusades,” Medieval Life: A New Magazine of 
the Middle Ages, (1997). 
41 Ibid.  
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conversion of the Lithuanian monarchy doomed the Teutonic Order.
42
 The Order no longer had a 
religious reason for maintaining its presence in the Baltic, so they became purely an economic 
and political entity by the late fourteenth century. Conversely, recruiting members to join the 
order or go on a crusade in the Baltic was always a challenge according to Stefan Vander Elst in 
“Chivalry, Crusade, and Romance on the Baltic Frontier.” According to Elst it took until the 
middle of the fourteenth century to get a steady supply of troops flowing into the Baltic.
43
 The 
Order had to utilize incentives to bring in recruits such as holding jousts, hunts, and hosting 
massive feasts for the crusading armies.
44
 Furthermore, they drew on chivalry for motivation, 
and they changed the words in older chronicles to reflect the chivalric culture. For example, 
Christians killed in raids by pagan tribes were often depicted in the chronicles as genderless, but 
in the fourteenth century these same victims became women in the re-written chronicles.
45
 
According to Elst this was done to depict the victims as damsels in distress while the crusading 
knights were holy warriors trying to rescue them. Elst and Hardwick reflect the rising scholarly 
trend of trying to determine why the Teutonic Order was involved in the Baltic. 
Another popular topic studied is the military strategy used by the Order in subjugating the 
tribes and securing the expanding border from incursions, and people defend their tactics as 
necessary or admonish them as too brutal. Urban the military strategy was harsh, but he does not 
view the Order’s tactics as brutal.46 In “The Organization and Defense of the Livonian Frontier 
in the Thirteenth Century,” Urban argues their tactics were dictated by the pagan tribes’ raiding 
parties. The Teutonic Order would either conquer or be given land to protect, and they would 
                                                             
42 Ibid.  
43 Stefan Vander Elst, “Chivalry, Crusade, and Romance on the Baltic Frontier.” Mediaeval Studies 73, (2012), 295. 
44 Vander Elst, “Chivalry, Crusade, and Romance on the Baltic Frontier,” 296-297, 304 
45
 Vander Elst, “Chivalry, Crusade, and Romance on the Baltic Frontier,” 315-316 
46 William Urban’s articles “Victims of the Baltic Crusade” and “The Organization and Defense of the Livonian 
Frontier in the Thirteenth Century,” Speculem 48, no. 3 (July 1973), 526 share this argument.  
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construct castles to serve as bases for patrols.
47
 The Order was there to defend the newly 
acquired land, so their main concern was protecting what was part of Christendom until 
Crusading armies came to assist them in campaigns.
48
 As a result a system of raids and counter-
raids developed.
49
 This style of fighting was typical of the time, so neither the pagans nor the 
Crusaders adopted new, brutal tactics. In “Victims of the Baltic Crusade,” Urban builds on this 
concept by arguing the length of the time the wars of conquest took contributed to them being 
such cruel contests.
50
 In addition, the Teutonic Order employed recent converts in its army, and 
they were frequently traditional enemies of the tribe currently being fought, so that made 
atrocities more likely from all parties.
51
  
Studying the political complexities the Teutonic Order faced helped shape current trends, 
which have gone away from the Teutonic Order as simply being a benevolent or malevolent 
force in the Baltic, and what has emerged is a more complex narrative. This work fits into this 
emerging context, but it focuses on the period from 1147-1309, which is less frequently 
examined. The period has been re-examined to determine the root causes of the Baltic Crusades. 
Although Christiansen and Urban are largely in agreement, this project examines their key 
differences in greater detail.  Like Christiansen I argue economics played a much greater role in 
this period of the crusading movement. Furthermore, like Urban I argue the Baltic Crusades were 
largely religiously motivated, but they originally started as an economic and political movement 
that gradually gained religious traction through zeal. Most importantly, these trends were fueled 
by the political tensions that existed within the Holy Roman Empire. 
                                                             
47 Ibid 
48 Ibid., 525. 
49
 Ibid.,” 527. 
50 Urban, “Victims of the Baltic Crusade.” 
51 Ibid. 
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The initial campaign against the Wends in 1147, although religiously approved and 
justified, was more for economic reasons.
52
 The Wendish Crusade is unique in that the reason it 
developed was primarily economic, and there were several key factors. First, the economies of 
the pagan tribes (and to an extent the Danes) were built on trading and raiding. In the eleventh 
century, the Danish nobility started to rely more on raiding in the Baltic because it was 
economically more viable than trying to conquer land or raid in England.
53
 An able administrator 
who could finance a trade ship or work his peasants could gain more profit than raiding in 
England.
54
 Moreover; when Danish nobles invaded England they had to maintain larger armies 
of mercenaries, and they could only fund large armies when they controlled large amounts of 
land in England. Unless they captured and maintained a lot of land in England raiding there had 
little value, so the Baltic provided a much easier and cheaper way of increasing their wealth. 
However, the raiding went both ways, and Denmark was frequently being raided by the Baltic 
Slavs.
55
 The raids were intense enough that they were gradually forcing the Danish nobles to stay 
on the defensive. This caused a dilemma as conducting raids throughout the Baltic while 
preventing enemy raids became increasingly vital. Second, trade in the Baltic was important for 
economic success, and the Danish nobles were in competition with both the Slavs and the 
Germans. Some of this competition stemmed from the highly desired amber that could be found 
in the Baltic.
56
 Amber was a rare product, and the amber in the Baltic was the highest quality, so 
it provided considerable revenue. Also, five major rivers emptied into the Baltic, so trade routes 
were plentiful, but they were also important to control as Eric Christiansen stated, “For the river 
(the Vistula) was an economic artery, and the more of it a ruler controlled, the richer he got; the 
                                                             
52 Christiansen, The Northern Crusades, 49 
53 Ibid. 26 
54
Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 27 
56 Urban, The Teutonic Knights, 47 
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more he competed for power and wealth along its sources and tributaries, the more he was 
interested in the affairs of those who lived beyond its mouth.”57 More importantly, as the rivers 
became economically important, controlling the actions of all of the people involved became 
important, and neither the Slavs nor the Germans were accountable to the Danes.  
The economic challenge was formidable, but a solution to this dilemma emerged in 1147 
when the northern nobles were asked to go on a crusade to the Holy Lands. Rather than travel to 
the Holy Lands, the northern nobles requested to go fight the pagans in the Baltic. The Church 
complied and called for complete destruction or complete conversion of the pagans, and they 
forbade making peace with the pagans for tribute or payment.
58
 The Church wanted a purelt 
religious expedition, but the chronicler Helmold observed shortly into the campaign that the 
Christian nobles realized they were hurting their own financial gain if they killed too many 
pagans or despoiled too much of the land.
59
 He further stated, 
From that day, then, uncertainty of purpose began to seize the army and repeated truces 
to lighten the investment. As often as the Slavs were beaten in an engagement, the army 
was held back from pursuing the fugitives and from seizing the strongholds. Finally, 
when our men were weary, an agreement was made to the effect that the Slavs were to 
embrace Christianity and to release the Danes whom they held in captivity. … Thus, the 
grand expedition broke up with slight gain. The Slavs immediately afterwards became 
worse: they neither respected their baptism nor kept their hands from ravaging the 
Danes.
60
 
Although the nobles claimed they fought to protect Christians they were clearly motivated by 
money. They were afraid to fight for the total conversion or total destruction the Church 
proposed because they wanted to protect their economic interests, and destroying the land or the 
                                                             
57 Christiansen, The Northern Crusades, 11 
58 Bernard of Clairvaux, “Proclamations of Northern European Crusades,” in The Crusades, ed. S. J. Allen and Emilie 
Amt (University of Toronto Press Incorporated, 2010), 269 
59
 Helmold, “Helmold’s Chronicle of the Slavs,” The Crusades, ed. S. J. Allen and Emilie Amt, (University of Toronto 
Press Incorporated, 2010), 272 
60 Ibid. 272. 
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pagans would hurt them economically. As a result the crusaders turned the expedition into 
essentially a large raid. They got booty, made a token effort to convert the pagans, and then went 
back home. As a result the clergy would later refine the crusading movement to prevent similar 
disasters.  
The nobles’ overt attempt to increase their wealth (as witnessed by Helmold) is almost 
completely gone in later sources, and that is because the economic motivations dwindled. 
Economic concerns of the Danish and German nobility lessened because land acquisition was 
not generally possible in the Baltic Crusades. First, conquered territories were divided between 
the Church and the local monastic order, the Swordbrothers, and the deal included all future 
conquests, so there was not much land an ambitious noble could legitimately claim.
61
 Second, 
the nature of raiding changed. For centuries the people in the Baltic relied on small, open decked 
ships for transportation.
62
 Although raiding was difficult with such vessels, it was equally 
difficult to defend one. All of that changed with the increased use of cogs because they were 
taller and much harder to assault.
63
 As the pagans did not have an abundance of cogs, raiding 
cogs with their smaller ships became increasingly difficult. In one instance Henry of Livonia 
talked about how nine crusader cogs fought off 200 pagan ships.
64
 When the number of cogs 
possessed by the Christian nations increased it became harder to attack them on the open sea. At 
the same time over land raids became increasingly common. As, A Christian community that 
closely bordered the pagan tribes was established when the crusaders conquered the Livs from 
1198-1202, so raids and counter-raids increased in frequency and severity along the border, 
                                                             
61 The Chronicle of Henry of Livonia, 69-70 
62 Christiansen, The Northern Crusades, 15-16 
63
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including the winter season (an impossible feat on the sea because it froe).
65
 The most intense 
raiding occurred on the southern border of the Livonian frontier during the crusades.
66
 Raiding 
and counter raiding essentially became part of the yearly routine of the border defense, so calling 
a crusade to counter pagan raiding parties was redundant and unnecessary.
67
 Furthermore, the 
economy in the Baltic was stabilizing.
68
 Through war and peace the pagan Lithuanians and the 
Germans continued to trade rather than raid when possible.
69
 Establishing good trade relations 
was more economically viable than relying on raids, so raids as a primary means of economic 
enrichment diminished. It is important to note economic motivations did not disappear quickly 
(nor can one say they were ever completely eradicated). In 1195 Earl Birger, a minor Swedish 
noble, raided the Estonians for a few days after his crusade was swept off course, and he 
accepted tribute to leave.
70
 He was so excited about his loot that he forgot to convert the pagans 
although it was part of the deal he made with them in addition to the tribute. However, the 
economic incentives rapidly diminished, and were no longer a major factor by the time the 
Teutonic Order took over the Baltic Crusades in 1230. 
The final reason economic incentives waned was the increasing involvement on the part 
of the Church and the introduction of military orders to run the crusades. The Livonian crusade 
made it apparent a military monastic order would be needed in order to keep the new 
communities safe.
71
 Secular armies were seasonal, undisciplined, and unreliable, so a permanent 
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force needed to be maintained.
72
  In 1200 the abbot of the monastery in Treiden, Brother 
Theodoric, was concerned the pagans would overwhelm the Christian communities in Livonia, 
so he created a monastic order called the Swordbrothers.
73
 The Swordbrothers adopted the same 
rules as the Knights Templars and were intended to protect the new community in Riga while 
Theodoric worked to expand the Christian community. Military monastic orders provided armies 
that were generally cheaper to train and more disciplined than their secular counterparts.
74
 
Although land granted to the monastic orders was lost from the tax base, raising an army through 
a monastic order was cheaper and more reliable than the alternative, so that alleviated some of 
the military burden from the Christian nobles. Furthermore, the nobles would not have to provide 
as many troops in future campaigns, so their economic burden lessened. However, the 
Swordbrothers were a small order, so their resources were constantly stretched thin. They relied 
on the tax incomes from their holdings in the Baltic to fund the defense, but complaints against 
the Swordbrothers came in quickly.
75
 Both the Livs and the Letts complained that the 
Swordbrothers were mistreating their people and taking their property. In both cases the 
Swordbrothers were permitted to retain some of what they took (or were granted different 
property), but they had to give back some of it and pay the locals for the injustices.
76
 This 
complicated their situation because they were a small order that already suffered from small 
recruitment numbers.
77
 Because they had insufficient membership, they had to hire more 
mercenaries. However, they could not pay for all of the mercenaries without raising taxes, but 
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the recent converts did not want to pay more taxes. As a result the only solution was to increase 
the tax base, and that meant expansion was necessary. Therefore, economic concerns shifted 
from the nobles to the Swordbrothers. As a result economic concerns persisted, but they did not 
affect as many people. 
A wealthier, more powerful order would not have been so financially strained like the 
Swordbrothers, so why did Theodoric not bring in an established order? Theodoric chose not to 
bring in Knights Templars or Knights Hospitallers (more experienced and powerful order based 
in the Holy Lands) for a variety of reasons. The biggest concern for the existing orders was 
finances.
78
 It made little financial sense for a military order based in the Holy Lands to spread its 
resources into the Baltic without being able to finance the expedition from the resources gained 
in the new theater. The Baltic region lacked an established economic base, and therefore the 
established orders were not interested in aiding in this endeavor. Fighting for Christ is difficult to 
do when one cannot finance the expedition. Furthermore, this would spread their manpower 
thinner across all of their fronts. A new order could concentrate solely in the Baltic, so its 
resources were not divided between two theaters. Creating a new order allowed Theodoric and 
Bishop Albert to address an immediate need of manpower cheaper and quicker than any other 
means. The new order’s holdings would all be in the Baltic, so they could react and bring all of 
their forces to bear against pagan threats much quicker. Furthermore, the Baltic Crusades were 
still in their infancy, so their goals were not completely worked out. In the Holy Lands the goal 
was simple: maintain Jerusalem and a Christian state. In the Baltic they knew they wanted to 
convert the pagans, but leaders debated whether conversion or conquest was the best option. 
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Creating a monastic order provided an immediate boost to manpower to protect the recent 
converts while being more financially viable for Theodoric.  
To limit the economic strains a powerful order was needed, but the powerful orders were 
focused on the Holy Lands. However, the moderately powerful and wealthy Teutonic Order was 
invited to crusade in the Baltic, and their involvement reduced the economic incentives to a 
minimum. The Teutonic Order was founded in 1190 but remained relatively small until Grand 
Master Hermann von Salza, a Hohenstaufen loyalist and advisor to Emperor Frederick II, took 
over in 1210. Hermann managed to build the order through efficient politicking. During the 
crusading campaign to Damietta in 1217 he was often looked to for advice and leadership 
because the Germans had contributed considerable resources to the campaign, and this allowed 
him to secure considerable donations and favors for the Order.
79
 These donations enabled the 
order to grow, and they achieved a level of prosperity much greater than the Swordbrothers, so 
they were not as financially strained. Moreover, the Teutonic Order was granted more assets in 
the Baltic than the Swordbrothers ever acquired. Before the Teutonic Order committed troops to 
the Baltic they made a deal with Duke Conrad of Mosavia that granted them land, but they had 
deals with secular rulers fall through before.
80
 Luckily for the Order, Hermann was on excellent 
terms with Frederick II and would continue to be so for many years. As a result he confirmed the 
Order’s deal with Duke Conrad, and he went a step further by giving his approval of the deal in 
the Golden Bull of Rimini in 1226.
81
 The Golden Bull is an ambiguous document, and the only 
specifics that are mentioned are the Order would be granted land in Culm, and it would hold the 
land free of service and exaction (it would be independent from the empire), collect taxes, tolls, 
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set up markets, administer justice, and coin money. Compared to the Swordbrothers the Order 
had considerable resources at their disposal. They controlled all of the land they conquered 
compared to one third of the land the Swordbrothers conquered, thus, they had a larger tax 
base.
82
 Furthermore, they did not have to pay taxes to the Church whereas the Swordbrothers 
paid one fourth of the tithes they collected to the bishop as a sign of obedience.
83
 In addition , the 
Order had a considerable number of estates outside of the Baltic.
84
 Land that was won or lost on 
the frontier had very little impact on their economic situation, so expanding for economic 
reasons was not important. The Teutonic Order was financially more stable because they secured 
greater donations and had more financial assets both in and outside the Baltic.  
The Order had much less economic motivation, but the natives still complained about 
them while they campaigned in the Baltic. The complaints against the Teutonic Order claimed 
they took too much property, but it would be wrong to assume they were economically 
motivated. The money the Order collected through taxes was used to maintain the defenses 
rather than further conquests. As Urban points out,  
The castles were financed by native taxes and gifts from Germany. Taxes were never sufficient, 
and varied from locality to locality. Tribes which had proven loyal for generations or whose 
obedience could not be guaranteed were taxed only by the Zins (cens), an amount equal to three 
bushels of grain per farmstead. The natives considered that a heavy but bearable tax. Other tribes 
paid the Zehnte (tithe), which was twice the other.
85
 
Although they were a wealthy order they still hand to fund their defenses. In addition to 
maintaining the defenses, tax rates were used to encourage loyalty. The Order varied their tax 
levels to fit each locality, so a tribe that was really loyal or recently converted would have a 
much lower tax level. The taxes were meant to fund their defenses, but they also encouraged 
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loyalty because loyal tribes paid less in taxes. Their high tax levels served practical purposes 
rather than enriched the Order. Moreover, the Order’s taxes were no more oppressive than what 
Christians in Germany faced.
86
 Their economic policies also created a more stable economy 
similar to what existed in Germany.
87
 Economic motivations had severely waned, and religious 
and political motivations were the primary causes for the ensuing crusades. 
While economic and religious incentives were fluctuating in importance, political 
motivations remained a constant influence on the Baltic Crusades. The biggest factor that 
influenced the Baltic Crusades was the tenuous politics within the Holy Roman Empire because 
it provided the opportunity for competing factions to increase their power. The northern German 
nobles wanted to increase their power vis à vis the emperor, and the Hohenstaufen emperors 
wanted to increase their influence over the northern nobles by creating a base of power in Italy. 
The Teutonic Order took advantage of the ongoing struggle in Imperial Germany to pursue a 
base of power and recruitment center in Europe. 
 The power struggle in Germany was facilitated by the volatile power structure in 
Imperial Germany. Unlike French and English lords, the German princes got their power through 
allodial lands instead of fiefs.
88
 This meant the land was not parceled out by emperor, so the 
princes were not technically his vassals. Land was completely controlled by the local families 
without restriction, and as a result it was much harder for the emperor to control the nobility in 
the Holy Roman Empire than it was for the English. Furthermore, each emperor usually had to 
create a base of power around his ancestral, allodial lands before exerting control over the 
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princes. The emperor, much like the princes, was very powerful in his home territory because he 
and his family had complete control over it for years. However, royal influence grew 
increasingly weaker as the emperor moved away from his native home because the diplomatic 
relations were usually not as strong between distant provinces. In addition, the Empire stretched 
from Burgundy to Germany to Italy, so it was hard to control regardless of the power structure. 
Prior to the Wendish Crusade, Emperor Frederick Barbarossa was attempting to make his 
ancestral lands of Swabia the center of his empire, so he left the northern princes to their own 
devices.
89
 Moreover Barbarossa sought to strengthen his control over Italy which would enable 
him to use the wealthy lands there to better control the German nobility; something which his 
predecessors had failed to do.
90
 
The absence of Barbarossa from northern Germany exacerbated the political tensions in 
the north, and that had a major impact on the Baltic Crusades. The German nobles took every 
opportunity they could to increase their power, and the northern nobles in particular noticed their 
independence and power increased in Barbarossa’s absence.91 When the northern nobles attacked 
the Wends in the early twelfth century it was in large part to continue building their power.
92
 
Although they were requested to attack by the local bishop, it was not yet a religious campaign. 
The nobles were fighting to expand their own territory and gain booty rather than convert the 
pagans, so they were wars of conquest rather than conversion. Barbarossa’s cousin and main 
rival from the Welf family, Duke Henry the Lion of Saxony, was particularly successful at using 
these campaigns to spread his influence and increase his tax base by establishing towns and trade 
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on the frontier.
93
 Like Henry the Lion, the northern nobles were utilized Barbarossa’s policies for 
their own gain. As Imperial armies were no longer present in the northern provinces, Barbarossa 
could not control the nobles or quell unrest the pagan tribes caused, and as a result, this made the 
frontier less safe for missionaries and merchants. They responded by asking the German nobles 
for assistance.
94
 The northern princes provided escorts for the rapidly expanding trade networks, 
so they gained from all of the increased taxes, tolls, and court fines from their expanding 
jurisdictions. Furthermore, they were able to build more castles and increase their militaries to 
unprecedented levels. Clerical calls for aid against the Wendish encouraged the conquest of 
pagan lands and thereby increased their tax base and wealth. Moreover, when the bishop of 
Magdeburg appealed to the northern nobles to intervene, Henry the Lion was one of the first to 
respond, and he gained immense power and influence as a result.
95
 He was able to create a 
powerful state that sponsored colonization, fostered trade, and ultimately rivaled Frederick 
Barbarossa’s.96 Henry the Lion gained so much power he was able to leave on a Crusade to the 
Holy Lands in 1171. There was a lot to be gained by an ambitious noble in northern Germany, 
and Henry the Lion provided a model for the others. Barbarossa’s campaigns in Italy further 
exacerbated the problems in northern Germany because they threatened the papacy. In an attempt 
to undermine Barbarossa’s campaigns in Italy the papacy often sponsored rebellious factions in 
Germany.
97
 In effect this served to destabilize the region even more, and that helped contribute 
to the Baltic Crusades. The absence of Barbarossa provided an opportunity for the northern 
nobles to increase their power, and they utilized every means they could to do so, and that 
contributed to the start of the Baltic Crusades. 
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The Wendish Crusade was called less than forty years after the bishop of Magdeburg 
asked the northern nobles to intervene against the hostile pagans, and this campaign was similar 
in how it was conducted. It essentially turned into a raid that ended in large part because the 
German and Danish nobles could not decide how to divide the spoils.
98
 The noble crusaders had 
little interest in converting the pagans. It took time and constant urging from the popes and local 
clergy before the Baltic Crusades became more religious in their orientation.
99
 Furthermore, 
following the 1147 Wendish Crusade, heightened tensions between the pagans and the Christian 
kingdoms, bred more violence from the pagans including assassination attempts.
100
 In addition to 
the increased violence, the pagans developed a reputation of being deceptive, and this 
exacerbated the political problems between the pagan tribes and the Christian kingdoms.
101
 The 
weak central government in the Holy Roman Empire allowed the northern nobles to become 
increasingly ambitious. The political ambitions of the German and Danish nobles in the early 
twelfth century in conjunction with the tumultuous politics of the Holy Roman Empire sparked a 
series of events that would eventually lead to the Teutonic Order taking over the crusades in the 
Baltic.  
The Teutonic Order was established to care for the German crusaders in the Holy Lands, 
but the root cause for their creation was the competition between the Welfs and the 
Hohenstaufens in the Holy Roman Empire. Frederick Barbarossa was a Hohenstaufen ruler, and 
in 1188 he exiled his main opponent, Henry the Lion. After resolving that conflict he went on the 
Third Crusade with the French and English contingents, but he drowned on the way. As a result 
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King Richard the Lionheart of England, a Welf loyalist, took over command of the crusade. 
Many members of the German contingent immediately left to elect the new Holy Roman 
Emperor, but those who stayed were subject to frequent humiliation at Richard’s hands.102 The 
psychological humiliation was compounded by the lack of medical care, and these factors led to 
the foundation of the Teutonic Order.  
Shortly after the Order was founded its leaders wanted to secure a strong base of power, 
and this desire got them involved in the Baltic Crusades. In 1217 King Andrew II of Hungary 
invited the Order to combat the pagan Cumans, so he could go on a crusade in the Holy Lands. 
This campaign appealed to the Teutonic Order because they were promised land in Transylvania 
in addition to immunities from taxes and duties.
103
 They were granted the right to exercise 
justice, establish trade markets, and claim taxes and tolls. King Andrew II retained his right to 
coin money and claim half of any precious metal that may be found there.  This grant provided 
the base of power and recruitment the Teutonic Order desired. The Order agreed to the terms, 
and while Hermann von Salza and King Andrew II set out on the failed Fifth Crusade the Order 
initiated their operations against the pagans.
104
 Ultimately the Order was too successful. They 
easily drove the Cumans away and rapidly expanded their territory and built castles to defend 
their new holdings.
105
 The Hungarian nobles wanted the Order removed, and when they 
eventually got King Andrew’s approval the Order was driven out less than a decade after 
arriving.
106
 Getting involved in Hungary had several effects that shaped the Order and the Baltic 
Crusades.  First, the Teutonic Order now had to strike a balance between crusading in Europe, 
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crusading in the Holy lands, as well as negotiating imperial business throughout Europe.
107
 
Second, although some of the details of their agreement with King Andrew II are unknown, it is 
evident they lost everything they had been promised. Losing all of the land they were granted in 
Hungary made them more wary of the deals they made, and they would get later deals confirmed 
by both the pope and the secular rulers. Finally, the experience in Hungary encouraged the 
Teutonic Order to rely on Frederick II for political support, and this support is ultimately what 
got the Order involved in the Baltic. 
The Order’s attainment of a base of power was only possible through Hermann von 
Salza’s political connection to Emperor Frederick II. This connection enabled the Teutonic Order 
to gain power, influence, and eventually land in the Baltic. The Golden Bull of Rimini enabled 
the Order to establish a power base independent of imperial rule, and it exceeded the agreement 
they had made with King Andrew II in Hungary. Prussia was a logical place for their base of 
power and recruitment center. It was near Germany in addition to a pagan frontier they could 
expand into. Moreover, the Teutonic Order’s main source of recruits came from Thuringia, and it 
was close to Prussia.
108
 This suggests the Order’s motivation for fighting the Baltic pagans was 
to establish a power base. Furthermore, the Teutonic Order’s longtime political and military 
support of Frederick II made him more likely to support them. Frederick II had to choose his 
friends wisely and reward them appropriately due to the fractured nature of the Holy Roman 
Empire. One example of The Order’s loyalty was the failed campaign to Damietta in 1221. Many 
crusaders blamed Frederick II because he did not honor his vows, but Hermann did not blame 
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him.
109
 One reason for this was loyalty to the Hohenstaufens, but Frederick II also had a 
legitimate reason for delaying his vows. Crusades to the Holy Lands usually departed when the 
leaders had resolved all of their domestic disputes.
110
 Frederick II was almost constantly in 
conflict, so he continued to delay his crusading vows. Many other rulers made similar requests, 
so he was not asking for anything uncommon. However, he did ask for considerably more delays 
than was common, and he was still negotiating and delaying in 1220 over imperial and papal 
claims, which led to his excommunication.
111
 Despite this, he left on crusade in 1226, and 
Hermann and the Teutonic Order provided a contingent of knights for his disposal. The most 
immediate impact of Herman’s and the Teutonic Order’s loyalty was that they were generously 
rewarded when Frederick II reclaimed Jerusalem.
112
 Rewards for loyalty would continue to be 
granted to the Teutonic Order in the years to come, so the Teutonic Order benefited significantly 
from their friendship with Frederick II.
113
 Good relations with Frederick II helped get them 
involved in the Baltic Crusades, but the politics of the Swordbrothers were reason the Teutonic 
Order took control of the Baltic Crusades.  
When the Teutonic Order entered the Baltic Crusades it created two competing crusades. 
The Swordbrothers were fighting the Estonians while the Teutonic Knights were fighting the 
Prussians further south. This diverted resources from both fronts, and it was exacerbated by the 
politics of Imperial Germany. During periods of internal strife more crusading armies arrived 
from Germany as nobles wanted their land protected by the crusading privileges.
114
 As soon as 
the civil wars ended the German nobles were content to stay at home rather than crusade, so the 
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number of crusaders flowing to the frontlines constantly fluctuated. However, the competition 
between the two fronts ended when the Teutonic Order took over the entire crusading movement 
in the Baltic, and the Order could send crusading armies where they were most needed in the 
Baltic. They took control of the crusades for several reasons. First, the Swordbrothers’ actions 
were causing a lot of tension in the Baltic, so they were becoming a political liability. On several 
occasions the Swordbrothers attempted to take land from the Danes and the clergy to extend their 
borders, and this drew them into a war with the papal legate.
115
 They had been in several 
conflicts because they wanted more power, and by 1230 their bad reputation was sealed.
116
 Pope 
Gregory IX took action against the Swordbrothers and declared the Teutonic Order was the 
papacy’s partner in the Baltic Crusades in 1234.117 This put more pressure on the Swordbrothers, 
but it also enhanced the reputation of the Teutonic Order and gave them more influence in the 
Baltic. Second, after the Swordbrothers increased their taxes on the native population to finance 
their wars every converted tribe wanted them gone. A Christian army increased this pressure 
even more by invading the Swordbrothers’ possessions. The master of the Swordbrothers 
formally requested his knights be admitted into the Teutonic Order, but they were refused 
admission because they caused so much trouble. Prompted by their remaining allies, they 
allowed a crusading army to convince them to launch an ill-advised attack on Lithuania, during 
which the Swordbrothers were annihilated in the Battle of Saule.
118
 They lost over fifty knights, 
and they were no longer an effective fighting force. Their political ambitions outstretched their 
practical abilities. The Teutonic Order officially absorbed the remaining Swordbrothers and took 
over all of their duties in Livonia. Political policies of the Swordbrothers were instrumental in 
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making the Teutonic Order the leader of the Baltic Crusades, and the Teutonic Order would drive 
the Baltic Crusades into the fifteenth century. 
Religious and missionary zeal contributed to the start of the Baltic Crusades, and it would 
eventually be one of the dominate causes for the crusades. For the most part, peaceful missions 
to convert the pagans were encouraged, but the Magdeburg diocese appealed to western nobles 
to take lands from the Wends as early as 1108 to pacify the pagans. Although most of the nobles 
were still fighting for economic and political reasons, it is evident the Church wanted all of the 
crusades to be for religious reasons. Pope Eugenius called the Second Crusade to reclaim 
Jerusalem in December 1145, and the Pope wanted every Christian kingdom to send a contingent 
to the Holy Lands. However, the Spanish and Saxon nobles were requested to fight the Muslims 
in Spain and the heathen Wends respectively.
119
 Bernard of Clairvaux convinced Pope Eugenius 
to authorize the Baltic Crusades after the northern nobles approached him and requested to 
crusade against the pagans. Bernard clearly felt God was moving to protect Christendom and 
convert heathens through the crusading movement. Bernard was further convinced the nobles’ 
zeal was genuine, and he argued God moved the nobles to drive paganism out of Christian 
lands.
120
 He further argued converting the pagans would do more harm to Satan than converting 
all of Israel.
121
 Bernard’s conviction that the pagans needed to be fought to preserve Christendom 
led to key institutional and ideological shifts that would turn the Baltic Crusades into highly 
religious movements. 
The Baltic Crusades underwent some crucial institutional and ideological changes that 
transformed them from a religious excuse to meet economic and political ends to a religious 
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mission. When Pope Eugenius and his successors granted permission for the German nobles to 
crusade against the pagans they expanded the theological understanding of just warfare. 
Augustine of Hippo argued wars were righteous when they were conducted in obedience to God 
and to protect the public, and all peaceful means were exhausted. The true evils in war were love 
of violence and lusting for power.
122
 More importantly a war was just when the monarch 
demanded war.
123
 The Baltic Crusades expanded this concept because now the Church and 
monastic orders had the right to initiate just wars rather than the nobility. Furthermore, any war 
waged against the pagans was a just war.
124
 Fighting a just war by defending the faith and ethnic 
Germans became a key component in the succeeding Baltic Crusades. This concept of just war 
and the religious threat of paganism became a key foundation for why the Christian nobles 
crusaded against the pagans, and it became a major justification for the Church and monastic 
orders. 
The rise of forced conversions was even more important of an ideological development. 
In the Wendish Crusade it was the first time forced conversions were legitimized by the 
Church.
125
 Conquest and conversion had been related before, but the crusade against the Wends 
was the first campaign that the Church sponsored forced conversions.
126
 It did not take long for 
forced conversions to be readily accepted by the Church, and eliminating a hostile tribe through 
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conversion became an accepted tactic.
127
In addition to sanctioning forced conversions, the 
Church put the crusades in the Baltic on equal footing as the crusades in the Holy Land with the 
pope issued the bull Non parum animus noster in 1171.
128
 This bull granted the same religious 
rewards for the crusaders in the Baltic as those in the Holy Land, such as full remission of sins. 
The rising influence of forced conversions is evident in the Livonian Crusade as 
enforcing conversions became accepted. Similar to the Wendish Crusade there was an initial, 
peaceful missionary effort conducted by the local bishop, Meinhard, and his assistant Brother 
Theodoric. However, a novel (yet recurring) problem presented itself. The natives in Uexküll 
promised to convert to Christianity if they were provided with a stone fort to protect themselves 
from Lithuanian raids.
129
 Bishop Meinhard agreed and even sponsored a portion of the fort with 
his own money. However, when the fort was built the Livonians reneged on their promise to be 
baptized, and those who were already baptized relapsed.
130
 The neighboring pagans in Holm 
cheated Meinhard in a similar manner.
131
 In addition, the pagans made every effort to prevent 
Meinhard (including an assassination attempt) from leaving the area and informing the pope.
132
 
Eventually his assistant, Brother Theodoric, escaped and presented their dilemma to the church, 
“When the supreme pontiff heard how many had been baptized, he thought that they 
should not be deserted and decreed that they ought to be forced to observe the faith which 
they had freely promised. He granted, indeed, the remission of all sins to all those who 
would take the cross and go to restore that newly founded church.
133” 
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The Church saw they had many new “converts,” and they wanted to retain what this new 
addition to the Church. They already had a church and priests in the area, and they wanted to 
send a crusade there to enforce the pagans’ conversion. This was a new reason to start a crusade 
as previously every crusade was either an attempt to drive Muslims out of Christian territories or 
to protect Christians. Pagans converted and reneged during the Wendish Crusade, but the Church 
did not enforce their conversions, so this was a new approach. The false conversion also altered 
Christians’ trust of pagan promises. For example, in 1200 Bishop Albert did not believe the 
pagans when they said they wanted peace.
134
 This attitude would persist throughout the Baltic 
Crusades, and a pattern of enforcing conversions and not trusting peace agreements emerged.  
The major ideological shifts coupled with major institutional shifts. The most important 
institutional change that took place was the introduction of military orders as a means of defense 
against pagan incursions rather than using them to fight against Muslims. Relying on a military a 
monastic order instead of crusaders or imperial armies for protection had many benefits. The 
most obvious benefits have already been explored in detail: they were cheaper and provided 
more consistent protection compared to the seasonal crusader armies. Their ranks relied on 
nobles members and this provided a constant presence of professional troops which deterred 
attackers.  Moreover, a military monastic order in the Baltic provided both spiritual and combat 
leadership. The Baltic Crusades were disjointed during the later twelfth century. German and 
Danish knights did not know the lay of the land or have common goals. A monastic order based 
on the frontier could scout out enemy weaknesses throughout the year and use the crusading 
armies that came in the summer to exploit them. From a religious standpoint monastic orders 
were, theoretically, more likely to share the same ideals as the bishop. An order founded to 
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protect Christianity would be much less likely to succumb to bribery than noble crusaders. For 
example, during the Livonian Crusade nobles granted the pagans truces in return for tribute.
135
 
This hindered the conversion process in the Baltic, and it frustrated the clergy.
136
 The Teutonic 
Order implemented aggressive campaigns, but they stopped when it appeared the pagans were 
about to convert.
137
 Bringing in a militant monastic order was a crucial step in the evolution of 
the Baltic Crusades because it helped center the campaigns around religion.  
Military orders took over the bulk of the defense for the remainder of the northern 
crusades in 1202, under the Swordbrothers, and in 1230, when the Teutonic Order took over the 
campaigns. The rise of military orders reflects the changing religious values in the Christian 
kingdoms. Traditional knighthood came into question, and Bernard of Clairvaux praised the 
Templars’ new concept of knighthood.138 Knights in military orders were ideal knights that 
fought for Christ, and they served as a bastion of defense against the heathens. Despite these 
general changes, monastic orders varied in their habits and values, and the differences between 
the Swordbrothers and the Teutonic Knights reflect the different religious causes for the crusade. 
First, the Swordbrothers were created specifically to protect and expand Christendom in the 
Baltic during the Livonian Crusade, so unlike the Teutonic Order their main purpose was the 
defense of the Baltic.
139
 Second, the Swordbrothers were based completely on the Rule of the 
Templars while the Teutonic Knights used both the Templar and Hospitaller Rules, so 
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ideologically the two orders were different.
140
 The Swordbrothers followed a military-monastic 
model, and although they valued many of the same ideals as the Teutonic Order (such as 
voluntary poverty), military-monastic orders placed a greater emphasis on improving oneself 
through prayer and meditation.
141
 Monks in the Swordbrothers were focused much more on 
waging war because it was how they reconciled remaining in isolation and trying to improve 
themselves. On the other hand the Teutonic Order followed the military-hospitaller model.
142
 A 
hospitaller’s goal was to help the poor and needy, and fulfilling that goal was how they justified 
going to war. Therefore, from a basic ideological point of view the Teutonic Order did not 
benefit from fighting in the Baltic Crusades as much as the Swordbrothers.     
Protecting and spreading Christianity remained the main goals of the Teutonic Order 
throughout the thirteenth century, and it is evident in how they justified and conducted their 
campaigns. Although their main goal was the Holy Lands, fighting the pagans still fulfilled their 
religious duty because it could be classified as a just war.
143
 The Prussians were devastating the 
lands of the Christian Duke Conrad of Masovia.
144
 Moreover, they were killing the priests and 
other noncombatants. Therefore, fighting the pagans was part of their duty as members of the 
new knighthood. The Prussians’ actions gave the Teutonic Order a religious motivation to fight 
in the Baltic, and the destruction of the Swordbrothers in 1236 gave the Teutonic Order complete 
control of the Livonian frontier in addition to their duties in Prussia. This gave the Order more 
responsibilities, but they still embraced their religious motivations for crusading. Although the 
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Order was granted the right to take pagan lands, they relinquished land on several occasions.
145
 
When the pagan king Mindaugas converted in 1251 they stopped their attacks on his land and 
vacated their claim.
146
 Furthermore, when the Order had practically defeated the Samitians in 
1257 they still granted them a two year truce in the hope that they could convert them without 
further bloodshed.
147
 Also, the Teutonic Order maintained their garrison in Acre until the city 
was lost in 1291; and it was not until 1309 that the Teutonic Order moved their headquarters 
from Venice where the grand master was conducting wars against the Muslims to Marienburg in 
Prussia.
148
 This shows that the Teutonic Order focused on protecting Christendom even when 
they did not have a chance of winning. They kept sending troops to the Holy Lands and planned 
campaigns there until it was impossible to win, and then they focused completely on converting 
the pagans in the Baltic. This attitude reflected the view of the Church, and it reinforces the 
Teutonic Order was motivated by religious concerns. 
The increasing religious emphasis ultimately started being demonstrated by the secular 
rulers. Early evidence of a religious desire to convert pagans in the Baltic is revealed in the 
Golden Bull of Rimini that was declared in 1226. The Golden Bull states Grand Master Hermann 
fervently wanted this land to promote the work of Christ.
149
 In addition, it says “trusting also in 
the wisdom of this master (Hermann), a man mighty in word and deed, who will take up the 
matter forcefully with his Brothers and carry through the conquest manfully, not abandoning it as 
many did before him, who wasted so much time in this undertaking for nothing.”150 The Golden 
Bull illustrates the increasing religious pressure on rulers to spread Christianity. It was Frederick 
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II’s duty to protect Christendom, and the Bull reflects that when it stated, “Just as He created the 
Holy Roman Empire for the preaching of the gospel, so likewise we must turn our care and 
attention to the conquest and conversion of the heathen.”151 The language reflects a longstanding 
notion of a king’s responsibility to be a protector of the faith. Also, the Golden Bull suggests 
Frederick II either wanted Christianity to spread, and he wanted to put people in charge that 
would promote that goal, or the religious pressure was so intense that he felt obligated. 
Regardless, it demonstrates the increasing focus on religious reasons for crusading. Some of the 
Order’s religious motivations are revealed in the Golden Bull of Rimini, but the increasing 
pressure on the nobility is even more prevalent. The Baltic Crusades gradually transformed into a 
more religiously motivated movement. 
The Baltic Crusades were complex phenomena, and they reflected the dynamic culture 
and values in the Baltic. From the First Crusade in 1096 to the rise of the Baltic Crusade as the 
main crusading movement in 1309 the crusades were caused by the changing values Christians 
had. An emerging ethos combined with economic and political pressures caused the first crusade 
against the Wends in 1147. As the Baltic Crusades progressed economic concerns gradually 
waned, and religious concerns steadily took their place as causes for going on crusades. Political 
motivations remained prevalent throughout the crusades, and that was a result of the tumultuous 
politics of the Holy Roman Empire. Imperial politics fueled every aspect of the Baltic Crusades 
from start to finish. Barbarossa’s policies destabilized the region which allowed the northern 
nobles to increase their power. The ensuing conflicts between the northern nobles and the 
emperor increased need for military orders in the region, and they were an indirect cause of the 
Teutonic Order’s formation in the Holy Lands. Ultimately the lack of an imperial presence in the 
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Baltic to quell the Swordbrothers and Frederick II’s support of the Teutonic Order helped the 
Order gain power and take control of the Baltic Crusades. 
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Timeline of Events
152
 
1096-9 First Crusade to Jerusalem. 
1108 Appeal for war in Magdeburg diocese. 
1129-36 Rule of the Knights Templars written. 
1139-43 Conquest of Wagria and Polabia by the Saxons. 
1147 First crusade against the Baltic Slavs. 
1164 Subjugation of Abotrites. 
1171 Alexander III authorizes crusade against east-Baltic pagans. 
1181 Fall of Duke Henry the Lion. 
1188 First mission to the Livs 
1190 Teutonic Order founded in the Holy Lands. 
1198 Innocent III authorizes Livonian Crusade. 
1200 Bishop Albert authorizes creation of the Swordbrothers. 
1200-9 Conquest of the Livs and Letts. 
1217 Failed crusade in Damietta, Teutonic Order invited to fight in Hungary, Honorius 
III authorizes crusade against the Prussians. 
1226 Bull of Rimini grants Prussia to Teutonic Order. 
1230 Gregory IX authorizes Teutonic Order to combat the Prussians. 
1231-40 Western Prussians conquered. 
1254-6 Conquest of Samland. 
1290 Conquest of Semigallia by Teutonic Order. 
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1291 Fall of Acre. 
1309 Headquarters of Teutonic Knights moved to Marienburg. 
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